從追殺比爾(Kill Bill, 2003)到惡棍特工(Inglorious Basterds, 2009),再從惡棍特工,回頭看追殺比爾,昆汀塔倫提諾的復仇題材電影充滿暴力美學的元素。不過,這片子的後設語言,既非暴力本身,也非復仇本身,而是罪行的無法律追溯期限(imprescriptibility)、記憶的動力學(dynamic force of memory)、以及暴力復仇的倫理問題(ethics of violent vengence)。

在昆丁塔倫提諾的劇本裡,罪行的無法律追溯期限根本不是從法律的範疇去衡度罪行,換言之,不是從法律的判決來論斷正義,而是試圖從絕對正義去逼問出罪(crime)當中的惡(evil)。在法的場域中,可能是有限度的或象徵性的懲凶,或是透過政治交易來漂白與轉型。這也會使得暴力的惡,在時間或歷史的易變中事過境遷而隱匿或遺忘。因此,鄔瑪‧舒曼飾演的復仇刀女要追殺的不只是比爾這位首腦,她所做的也不是追殺,而是Kill Bill,結帳、清算,去結清欠她的帳單。戰犯法庭所提供的法律正義無法真正結清納粹對猶太人的「徹底了結」(final solution)所犯下的惡,因此,昆丁塔倫提諾透過仿真史實的敘事手法,讓納粹的首腦、宣傳者、劊子手聚集在劇院,並在女刺客預先拍攝的復仇影片的凝視下,被活活的燒死。

如果戰犯法庭處置的重頭戲是甲級或乙級戰犯(連首領此等甲上級的人物都未必能受到法律制裁,譬如希特勒在蘇聯攻入柏林前便自殺,而日本天皇則在美國的庇護下全身而退),那麼德國女哲學家漢娜‧厄蘭(Hannah Arendt)所指的那群「惡的平庸性」(banality of the evil)的執行者,那些沒有決策權、依法行事的大小囉囉們,甚至無法羅列在帳單清算中的逃匿者、共謀者、漂白者,正義之於他們又有何意義呢?在昆丁塔倫提諾的電影中,作惡的人都得付出代價,只是這代價未必是對稱的(如以牙還牙以眼還眼、拿命抵命),而是得留下傷痛、屈辱的痕跡,做為一種惡的見證。復仇刀女在清理掉田中幫後,在客棧大廳中喝令幫派囉囉,若有生還的可以離開,但必須把手腳留下,因為那都是屬於她的。惡棍特工的艾爾多中尉並未處決企圖漂白的納粹黨衛隊漢斯‧蘭達中校,而是同樣割下他前額頭皮,烙下卍字,因為要讓這些軍裝筆挺的納粹有無法把制服脫下的那種作惡的記號。

受害者或倖存者,生命延續的動力以及存活的意義並不是迴避傷痛或永無止盡的哀悼,當然也不是淡忘。在昆丁塔倫提諾的設定中,他們是逼求絕對正義的人,因而不僅是惡行的見證者,也是對惡的討債者。記憶的力可能裹限了生命的轉變而變得消沈軟弱,但也可能成為爭鬥的動力。那麼,傷痛記憶的動力學在實踐上有哪些可能?是暴力復仇嗎?還是如「納粹獵人」西蒙·維森塔爾(Simon Wiesenthal),致力於蒐集納粹犯行的證據,將藏匿在角落裡脫下制服的納粹送上法庭?電影畢竟有其特定的要素,尤其是精彩的動作片。昆丁塔倫提諾依舊是透過美學化的暴力語彙(漫畫、黑白、誇張噴血、殺戮場景等)來表現出這種記憶驅使的討債動力,也因而在視覺上更接近暴力的復仇,在心理上當然也是相當爽快過癮的,而容易讓人忽略電影暴力美學作為修辭(而不只是宣揚暴力本身)的別樣意涵。我們可以很直截了當地說昆丁塔倫提諾的電影就是在談暴力復仇嗎,就像我們去肯定「以牙還牙、以眼還眼、以命償命」這般地爽直嗎?若此,為復仇刀女鑄劍的八取大師告誡她的一席話便顯得突兀而疑惑:「報仇這條路絕對不可能是直線,而是像一座森林,在森林裡很快就會迷路,忘了自己是從哪裡進來」。

假使這一場場大快人心的懲凶治惡的武打和追殺場面,其背後的修辭不同於一般好萊塢片子的正義使者終將戰勝邪惡匪徒的單線邏輯,其特別之處在於昆丁塔倫提諾對「武士」持有的倫理觀。當復仇刀女單挑田中幫的女幫主御蓮,卻負傷時,御蓮說:「你打鬥不像武士,至少死法可以像個武士」;甚至,御蓮在得知原來自己的刀法遜於復仇刀女,御蓮還向她道歉,在飄盪的白雪中如櫻花優雅而從容地死亡。在追殺帳單上的名字,幾乎都有等著被報復和「償債」的準備。如果把這樣的修辭放在《惡棍特工》,真正的 “inglourious basterds"不是割下納粹頭皮的那幫游擊份子,而是曾經作惡但脫下制服的那些納粹囉囉,因此,艾爾多中尉或許想跟這些「不光彩混蛋們」說的是:你們殺人時不覺得混蛋,至少活著得記得是混蛋。

這當然是一種籲求與逼問,要那些作惡時光彩的人,肩負起作惡的責任。然而,在絕對正義的質問以及追殺討伐的復仇快感之餘,能否向觀眾提出別樣於「邪不勝正」的好萊塢動作片邏輯,去觸碰到在絕對正義與暴力復仇之間的一種幽微地帶?電影中美學化、份量重的、吸引票房的暴力復仇場景,是否反而更容易將暴力復仇等同於絕對正義?八取大師所說的那段耐人尋味的提醒,又如何在電影手法的呈現和觀影快感中產生它的效應?此外,武士精神真的是符合絕對正義,或者說,是暴力復仇的倫理典範嗎?或許昆丁塔倫提諾太著迷武士精神了,也或許那是西方現代化軍隊對國家、領袖絕對服從的主權型態中所缺乏的內在倫理,讓他誤以為武士精神可以是絕對正義所要求的一種承擔「暴力責任」的表現。在東亞戰爭與歐洲反法西斯脈絡是不盡相同的。日本的神道教、軍國主義與天皇崇拜結合在一起,武士道(侍,samurai)中忠義、名譽、克己等道德規範並不等同於絕對正義,反而更可能是為了服從天皇指令卻違逆絕對正義要求的一種暴力表現。如果一個曾經作惡的武士,對於死亡的終極理解是「你打鬥不像武士,至少死法可以像個武士」,仍舊將「武士」當作是人的全部來看待,那麼,這個兩次面對死亡的武士(一次殺敵,一次殺己),無法真正安息,而是成為一隻幽靈,如同黑澤明電影《夢》裡戰死的幽靈部隊,即便死了仍不知自己的死亡;或是被奉為「英靈」,就像靖國神社裡供奉著的甲級戰犯以及為國捐軀的兵士,其死亡的意義僅只是服從,與絕對正義所要求的對惡行的反思和責任無關。

當才華溢出國界,「祖國」終將成為生命的過客,或旁人眼裡的鄉愁。

俄國鋼琴家霍洛維茲(Vladimir Horowitz )1904年生於沙皇俄國時期的烏克蘭。他音樂養成的年代也是戰爭與革命的年代。沙俄打了兩年多的仗,外患內憂,脆弱的帝國滅不了無產階級人民的「蘇維埃怒火」。1917年的革命終結了帝制,列寧領導的蘇維埃社會主義政權成立,不到五年烏克蘭已經是蘇維埃社會主義共和國的聯盟國(即蘇聯)。霍洛維茲當時只是從基輔音樂院畢業兩年的十六歲少年。

1924年,霍洛維茲時值二十年華,才情洋溢,而年輕的革命政府正準備進入內部的政治肅反階段。經由父親的奔走,霍洛維茲在史達林帶來腥風血雨的獨裁統治前獲准離開蘇聯,隻身前往德國拜Artur Schnabel為師,以黑白琴鍵為自己開啟通往西方世界的大門,透過繚繞指間的琴韻滋潤歐美聽眾的心靈。然而,代價既高昂又殘酷。此後的六十年間,霍洛維茲沒再回到祖國,即便他的兩位兄長與母親陸續死於非命,即便他的父親因越過邊境被捕而流放古拉格集中營勞改,即便史達林政府允諾霍洛維茲可以自由進出蘇聯。

直至冷戰後期,1985年上台的戈巴契夫帶來改革開放的氛圍,霍洛維茲於隔年終於回到「祖國」,在莫斯科辦了一場演奏會。八十二歲的霍洛維茲年髮蒼疏,緩邁的姿態讓舉止更顯沈穩優雅,急徐自若地端坐史坦威鋼琴前,以樂音而非母語,為同胞訴說他這一生的經歷。Horowitz in Moscow也是他生前最後一張現場演奏唱片。我不確定他的演奏在莫斯科音樂院表演廳(The Great Hall of Moscow Conservatory)迴盪多久,但三年後,1989年11月5日,霍洛維茲離開人世;同年底,柏林圍牆倒塌。再兩年,1991年,烏克蘭宣布脫離蘇聯獨立。霍洛維茲人生的四分之三在歐美度過,入籍美國,娶義大利指揮家的女兒為妻,與妻子以法語交談,病逝於紐約,安葬在米蘭。「祖國」,如果對霍洛維茲而言有任何意義,它在時代轉折與個人生命的交錯中必定是碎裂離析的。「鄉愁」,若要尋得它的完整秘密,肯定不在某個他方,而是藏在 一曲曲動人的樂章。

霍洛維茲在莫斯科安排了兩首李斯特作的曲子,其中一首是李斯特義大利《巡年之禮》中〈佩托拉克十四行詩104號〉(Sonetto 104 del Petrarca)– 這是李斯特取材自文藝復興時期詩人佩托拉克的情詩所編寫的小品。在詩文與音符之間,在詩人的矛盾與琴師的沈靜之間,在時間的陌異與空間的切近之間,霍洛維茲透過佩托拉克的詩與李斯特的譜,是否向「祖國」和「同胞」傳達了一份難以言說、可待追憶的「鄉愁」?

〈佩托拉克,十四行詩,104號〉

我求無平和,又漠於爭戰

我恐懼也顧盼,灼燒又凍僵

我飛往天堂,也臥躺地上

無物為我持留,普世又為我奪獲

獄卒門不開,也不鎖

既不困我的耳,又不鬆我的綁

愛情取不了我的命,也毀不了我的枷

不讓我苟活,又不教我好過

我無舌地吼,無目地望

我求殘若渴,求援如乞

我愛戀別人,憎恨自己

我淚中含笑,我苦楚為食

或驚或慽若生若死:

這般如此,皆為你,我的女士

I find no peace, and have no arms for war,

and fear and hope, and burn and yet I freeze,

and fly to heaven, lying on earth’s floor,

and nothing hold, and all the world I seize.

My jailer opens not, nor locks the door,

nor binds me to hear, nor will loose my ties;

Love kills me not, nor breaks the chains I wear,

nor wants me living, nor will grant me ease.

I have no tongue, and shout; eyeless, I see;

I long to perish, and I beg for aid;

I love another, and myself I hate.

Weeping I laugh, I feed on misery,

by death and life so equally dismayed:

for you, my lady, am I in this state.

Source: Tolerance Between Intolerance and the Intolerable (《寬容:難容與難忍之間》),Paul Ricoeur edited, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1996.

*1990年諾貝爾文學獎得主,墨西哥詩人Octavio Paz在1987年7月15日於西班牙的瓦倫西亞舉辦的一場紀念「1937年瓦倫西亞第二屆反法西斯作家大會」的會議中發表的一篇講稿。Octavio Paz, from nobelprize.org

我對1937年夏天最深刻而雋永的印象,不是我和作家們碰面,或是讓我和同伴們振神入夜的政治話題。和西班牙以及她的人民的相遇著實震懾了我:我雙眼親睹的地景和歷史場所,我雙手親觸著的石頭,都是孩提時在書中曾經相識的。尤為甚者,是我所遇到的單純士兵、農人、工人、教師、記者、男孩、女孩、年老的男男女女。從他們身上,我瞭解到「手足情誼」(fraternity)和「自由」一詞一樣珍貴;它是人性中每天的麵包,共享的麵包。這並不只是一種文藝腔的說法而已。

有一晚,當瓦倫西瓦的防空砲嚇阻了敵人的進擊,幾位朋友和我在附近一個村子尋求庇護之處,以便躲避沿途的轟炸。當收留我們的農夫得知我來自墨西哥–協助共和政府陣營的一個國家,他不顧轟炸便跑到菜園挖起一顆西瓜款待我們,還拿來一條麵包與一甕酒。

我還可以講述一些故事,但我寧願以一樁插曲,一個深深打動我的回憶,來做結論:由於參加一個小群體(Stephen Spender會想起這件事,因為他也是我們的成員之一),我有機會造訪馬德里大學的校園,而它就座落於前線。在一名軍官的引領下,我們穿越一些建築物和房室,它們先前是圖書館和講堂,而今當作戰壕和軍事掩體。抵達一處堆滿沙袋的巨大圍牆時,軍官示意我們保持安靜。在牆的另一面,我們能夠清清楚楚地聽見人聲和笑聲。我壓低聲音問:「那是誰?」「是別人」,軍官回答。他的話起先著實嚇到了我,我的驚訝旋即轉為無限的苦楚。在那一刻我明白–永難忘懷的體悟–我們的敵人也擁有人的聲音。

The Joys and Perils of Victimhood
Volume 46, Number 6 · April 8, 1999
The Joys and Perils of Victimhood
By Ian Buruma

In his book The Seventh Million, the Israeli journalist Tom Segev describes a visit to Auschwitz and other former death camps in Poland by a group of Israeli high school students. Some students are from secular schools, others from religious ones. All have been extensively prepared for the visit by the Israeli Ministry of Education. They have read books, seen films, and met survivors. Nonetheless, after their arrival in Poland, Segev notes a degree of apprehension among the students: Will they suddenly collapse? Will they reemerge from the experience as “different people"?[1] The fears are not irrational. For the students have been prepared to believe that the trip will have a profound effect on their “identities," as Jews and as Israelis.

These regular school tours to the death camps are part of Israeli civic education. The political message is fairly straightforward: Israel was founded on the ashes of the Holocaust, but if Israel had already existed in 1933 the Holocaust would never have happened. Only in Israel can Jews be secure and free. The Holocaust was proof of that. So the victims of Hitler died as martyrs for the Jewish homeland, indeed as potential Israeli citizens, and the state of Israel is both the symbol and guarantor of Jewish survival.

This message is given further expression, on those wintry spots where the Jewish people came close to annihilation, by displays of the Israeli flag and singing of the national anthem. But Segev noticed a peculiarly religious, or pseudoreligious, aspect to the death camp visits as well. The Israeli students in Poland, in his view, were like Christian pilgrims in Jerusalem, oblivious to everything except the sacred places. They marched along the railway tracks in Auschwitz-Birkenau like Christians on the Via Dolorosa. They brought books of prayers, poems, and psalms, which they recited in front of the ruined gas chambers. They played cassette tapes of music composed by a Holocaust survivor named Yehuda Poliker. And at one of the camps, a candle was lit in the crematorium, where the students knelt in prayer.
The NYRB Book ClubThe NYRB Book ClubHUP_Sexual Fluidity

Some call this a form of secular religion. The historian Saul Friedlander was harsher and called it a union of kitsch and death. I felt the pull of kitsch emotion myself on my only visit to Auschwitz, in 1990. By kitsch I don’t mean gaudiness or camp, but rather an expression of emotion which is displaced, focused on the wrong thing, or, to use that ghastly word properly for once, inappropriate. I am not the child of Holocaust survivors. My mother was Jewish, but she lived in England, and no immediate relations were killed by the Nazis. And yet even I couldn’t escape a momentary feeling of vicarious virtue, especially when I came across tourists from Germany. They were the villains, I the potential victim. But for the grace of God, I thought, I would have died here too. Or would I? An even more grotesque calculation passed through my mind: How did I fit into the Nuremberg laws? Was I a Mischling of the first degree, or the second? Was it enough to have two Jewish grandparents, or did you need more to qualify for the grim honor of martyrdom? When would I have been deported? Would I have been deported at all? And so on, until I was woken from these smug and morbid thoughts by the sight of a tall man in American Indian dress, followed by young Japanese, Germans, and others of various nationalities banging on tambourines, yelling something about world peace.

All this seems far away from Primo Levi’s fears of oblivion. One of the cruelest curses flung at the Jewish victims by an SS officer at Auschwitz was the promise that even if one Jew survived the camp no one would believe what had happened to him, or her. The SS man was quite wrong, of course. We cannot imagine the victims’ torment, but we believe it. And far from forgetting the most recent and horrible chapter in the long book of Jewish suffering, the remembrance of it grows in volume the further the events recede into the past. Holocaust museums and memorials proliferate. Holocaust movies and television soap operas have broken box office records. More and more people visit the camps, whose rotting barracks have to be carefully restored to serve as memorials, and movie sets.

In a curious way, the Jewish Holocaust has been an inspiration for others. For almost every community, be it a nation or a religious or ethnic or sexual minority, has a bone to pick with history. All have suffered wrongs, and to an increasing and in my view alarming extent, all want these wrongs to be recognized, publicly, ritually, and sometimes financially. What I find alarming is not the attention we are asked to pay to the past. Without history, including its most painful episodes, we cannot understand who we are, or indeed who others are. A lack of historical sense means a lack of perspective. Without perspective we flounder in the dark and will believe anything, no matter how vile. So history is good, and it is right that victims who died alone and in misery should be remembered. Also, some minorities are still being victimized, the Tibetans for example. What is alarming, however, is the extent to which so many minorities have come to define themselves above all as historical victims. What this reveals, in my view, is precisely a lack of historical perspective.

Sometimes it is as if everyone wants to compete with the Jewish tragedy, in what an Israeli friend once called the Olympics of suffering. Am I wrong to detect a hint of envy, when I read that Iris Chang, the Chinese-American author of a recent best seller about the 1937 Rape of Nanking, wishes for a Steven Spielberg to do justice to that event? (Her book bears the subtitle The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II.[2] ) It is, it appears, not enough for Chinese-Americans to be seen as the heirs of a great civilization; they want to be recognized as heirs of their very own Holocaust. In an interview about her celebrity, Chang related how a woman came up to her in tears after a public reading and said that Chang’s account of the massacre had made her feel proud to be Chinese-American. It seems a very peculiar source of pride.

Chinese-Americans are not the only ones to be prey to such emotions. The idea of victimhood also haunts Hindu nationalists, Armenians, African-Americans, American Indians, Japanese-Americans, and homosexuals who have adopted AIDS as a badge of identity. Larry Kramer’s book on AIDS, for example, is entitled Reports from the Holocaust. Even the placid, prosperous Dutch, particularly those now in their teens and twenties, much too young to have experienced any atrocity at all, have narrowed down their historical perspective to the hardship suffered under German occupation in World War II. This is no wonder, since pre-twentieth-century history has been virtually abolished from the curriculum as irrelevant.

The use of Spielberg’s name is of course telling, for the preferred way to experience historical suffering is at the movies. Hollywood makes history real. When Oprah Winfrey played a slave in the movie Beloved, she told the press that she collapsed on the set, crying and shaking. “I became so hysterical," she said, “that I connected to the raw place. That was the transforming moment. The physicality, the beatings, going to the field, being mistreated every day was nothing compared to the understanding that you didn’t own your life." [3] And remember, this was just a movie.

My intention is not to belittle the suffering of others. The Nanking Massacre, during which tens and perhaps hundreds of thousands of Chinese were slaughtered by Japanese troops, was a terrible event. The brutal lives and violent deaths of countless men and women from Africa and China who were traded as slaves must never be forgotten. The mass murder of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire cannot be denied. Many Hindu temples and Hindu lives were destroyed by Muslim invaders. Women and homosexuals have been discriminated against. The recent murder of a gay college student in Laramie, Wyoming, is a brutal reminder of how far we have yet to go. And whether or not they are right to call Columbus a mass murderer on his anniversary day, there is no doubt that the American Indians were decimated. All this is true. But it becomes questionable when a cultural, ethnic, religious, or national community bases its communal identity almost entirely on the sentimental solidarity of remembered victimhood. For that way lies historical myopia and, in extreme circumstances, even vendetta.

Why has it come to this? Why do so many people wish to identify themselves as vicarious victims? There is of course no general answer. Histories are different, and so are their uses. Memories, fictionalized or real, of shared victimhood formed the basis of much nineteenth-century nationalism. But nationalism, though not always absent, does not seem to be the main driving force for vicarious victims today. There is something else at work. First there is the silence of the actual victims: the silence of the dead, but also of the survivors. When the survivors of the Nazi death camps arrived in Israel on rusty, overloaded ships, shame and trauma prevented most of them from talking about their suffering. Victims occupied a precarious place in the new state of Jewish heroes. It was as though victimhood were a stain that had to be erased or overlooked. And so by and large the survivors kept quiet. A similar thing happened in Western Europe, particularly in France. De Gaulle built a roof for all those who had come through the war, former resistants, Vichyistes, collabos, Free French, and Jewish survivors: officially all were citizens of eternal France, and all had resisted the German foe. Since the last thing French Jews wanted was to be singled out once again as a separate category, the survivors acquiesced in this fiction and kept quiet.

Even though the suffering of Japanese-Americans, interned by their own government as “Japs," cannot be compared to the destruction of European Jews, their reaction after the war was remarkably similar. Like the French Jews, they were happy to be reintegrated as citizens, and to blanket the humiliation they had suffered with silence. The situation in China was more political. Little was made in the People’s Republic of the Nanking Massacre because there were no Communist heroes in the Nationalist capital in 1937. Indeed there had been no Communists there at all. Many of those who died in Nanking, or Shanghai, or anywhere in southern China, were soldiers in Chiang Kai-shek’s army. Survivors with the wrong class or political backgrounds had enough difficulty surviving Maoist purges to worry too much about what had happened under the Japanese.

It was left up to the next generation, the sons and daughters of the victims, to break the silence. In the case of China, it took a change of politics: Deng Xiaoping’s Open Door policy toward Japan and the West had to be wrapped in a nationalist cloak; dependency on Japanese capital was compensated for by stabs at the Japanese conscience. It was only after 1982 that the Communist government paid any attention to the Nanking Massacre at all. But leaving China aside for the moment, why did the sons and daughters of other survivors decide to speak up in the Sixties and Seventies? How do we explain the doggedness of a man like Serge Klarsfeld, whose father was killed at Auschwitz, and who has done more than any Frenchman to bring the history of French Jews to public notice?

There is a universal piety in remembering our parents. It is a way of honoring them. But remembering our parents, especially if their suffering remained mute and unacknowledged, is also a way of asserting ourselves, of telling the world who we are. It is understandable that French Jews or Japanese-Americans wished to slip quietly into the mainstream by hiding their scars, as though their experiences had been like everyone else’s, but to their children and grandchildren this was not good enough. It was as if part of themselves had been amputated by the silence of their parents. Speaking openly about the communal suffering of one’s ancestors—as Jews, Japanese-Americans, Chinese, Hindus, etc.—can be a way of “coming out," as it were, of nailing the colors of one’s identity to the mast. The only way a new generation can be identified with the suffering of previous generations is for that suffering to be publicly acknowledged, over and over again. This option is especially appealing when few or indeed no other tags of communal identity remain, often precisely because of the survivors’ desire to assimilate. When Jewishness is reduced to a taste for Woody Allen movies and bagels, or Chineseness to Amy Tan novels and dim sum on Sundays, the quasi authenticity of communal suffering will begin to look very attractive.

The Harvard scholar K. Anthony Appiah made this point beautifully in an analysis in these pages of identity politics in contemporary America.[4] The languages, religious beliefs, myths, and histories of the old countries tend to fade away as the children of immigrants become Americans. This often leads to defensive claims of Otherness, especially when there is little Otherness left to defend. As Appiah said about hyphenated Americans, including African-Americans: “Their middle-class descendants, whose domestic lives are conducted in English and extend eclectically from Seinfeld to Chinese takeout, are discomfited by a sense that their identities are shallow by comparison with those of their grandparents; and some of them fear that unless the rest of us acknowledge the importance of their difference, there soon won’t be anything worth acknowledging." He goes on to say that “the new talk of ‘identity’ offers the promise of forms of recognition and of solidarity that could make up for the loss of the rich, old kitchen comforts of ethnicity." Alas, however, those forms too often resemble the combination of kitsch and death described by Saul Friedlander. Identity, more and more, rests on the pseudoreligion of victimhood. What Appiah says about ethnic minorities might even be applied to women: the more emancipated women become, the more some extreme feminists begin to define themselves as helpless victims of men.

But surely nationalities are not the same as ethnic minorities in America, let alone women. Indeed they are not. By and large, people of different nations still speak different languages, have different tastes in food, and share distinct histories and myths. These distinctions, however, are becoming fuzzier all the time. To a certain extent, especially in the richer countries, we are all becoming minorities in an Americanized world, where we watch Seinfeld while eating Chinese takeout. Few nations are defined by religion anymore, even though some, such as Iran and Afghanistan, are busy reviving that definition. And national histories, celebrating national heroes, are abolished in favor of social studies, which have replaced national propaganda based on historical continuity with celebrations of contemporary multiculturalism. Literary canons, though perhaps less under siege in Europe than they are in the United States, are also becoming increasingly obsolete. Combined with a great deal of immigration to such countries as Britain, Germany, France, and Holland, these developments have eroded what kitchen comforts of ethnicity remained in European nation-states.

Perhaps the strongest, most liberating, and most lethal glue that has bound national communities together is the way we choose or are forced to be governed. Some nations have been defined mainly by their political systems. The United States is such a place. Sometimes politics and religion are combined in monarchies. Nowhere is politics entirely devoid of irrational elements: customs, religion, and historical quirks all leave their marks. It was an extreme conceit born of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution that political Utopias could be based on pure reason. Nationalism, in the sense of worshipping the nation-state as an expression of the popular will, was part of this. Politics was destined to replace the bonds of religion, or region, or race. This did some good. It also did a great deal of harm. The twin catastrophes of communism and fascism showed how dangerous it is to see the nation-state as a pure expression of the people’s will. In any event, the ideological split between left and right, which was spawned by the division in the French National Assembly in 1789 and was eventually hardened by the cold war, effectively collapsed with the end of the Soviet Union. And the effects of global capitalism and multinational political arrangements, especially in Europe, have to some extent undermined the perception that nations are defined by the way they are governed. For it doesn’t seem to matter anymore how they are governed: decisions always appear to be made somewhere else. The current English obsession with the culture of Englishness has come just at the time of increasing integration into European institutions.

So where do we go in this disenchanted world of broken-down ideologies, religions, and national and cultural borderlines? From a secular, internationalist, cosmopolitan point of view, it may not seem such a bad world. That is, of course, if one is living in the wealthy, liberal West. It is surely good that nationalistic historical narratives have been discarded, that homosexuals can come out and join the mainstream, that women can take jobs hitherto reserved for men, that immigrants from all over the world enrich our cultures, and that we are no longer terrorized by religious or political dogma. A half-century of secular, democratic, progressive change has surely been a huge success. We have finally been liberated from irrational ethnic comforts. And yet, after all that, a growing number of people seek to return to precisely such comforts, and the form they often take is the pseudoreligion of kitsch and death. Tom Segev argues that the modern Israeli tendency to turn the Holocaust into a civic religion is a reaction against secular Zionism. The “new man"—socialist, heroic, pioneering—turned out to be inadequate. More and more, people want to rediscover their historical roots. To be serious about religion is demanding, however. As Segev says, “Emotional and historical awareness of the Holocaust provides a much easier way back into the mainstream of Jewish history, without necessarily imposing any real personal moral obligation. The ‘heritage of the Holocaust’ is thus largely a way for secular Israelis to express their connection to Jewish heritage."[5]

The same is true for many of us, whether Jewish, Chinese-American, or whatnot. The resurgence of Hindu nationalism in India, for instance, is especially strong among middle-class Hindus, who are reacting against the Nehruvian vision of a socialist, secular India. Since many urban, middle-class Hindus have only a superficial knowledge of Hinduism, aggressive resentment of Muslims is an easier option. And so we have the peculiar situation in India of a majority feeling set upon by a poorer, much less powerful minority.[6] But there is a larger context, too, particularly in the West. Just as the Romantic idealism and culture worship of Herder and Fichte followed the secular rationalism of the French philosophes, our attraction to kitsch and death heralds a new Romantic age, which is anti-rational, sentimental, and communitarian. We see it in the politics of Clinton and Blair, which have replaced socialist ideology with appeals to the community of feeling, where we all share one another’s pain. We saw it in the extraordinary scenes surrounding the death of Princess Diana, when the world, so TV reporters informed us, united in mourning. Princess Diana was in fact the perfect embodiment of our obsession with victimhood. Not only did she identify with victims, often in commendable ways, hugging AIDS patients here and homeless people there, but she was seen as a suffering victim herself: of male chauvinism, royal snobbery, the media, British society, and so on. Everyone who felt victimized in any way identified with her, especially women and members of ethnic minorities. And it says something about the state of Britain, changed profoundly by immigration, Americanization, and Europeanization, yet unsure of its status in Europe, that so many people felt united as a nation only when the princess of grief had died.

This sharing of pain has found its way into the way we look at history, too. Historiography is less and less a matter of finding out how things really were, or trying to explain how things happened. For not only is historical truth irrelevant, but it has become a common assumption that there is no such thing. Everything is subjective, or a sociopolitical construct. And if the civic lessons we learn at school teach us anything, it is to respect the truths constructed by others, or, as it is more usually phrased, the Other. So we study memory, that is to say, history as it is felt, especially by its victims. By sharing the pain of others, we learn to understand their feelings, and get in touch with our own.

Vera Schwarcz, a professor of East Asian studies at Wesleyan University, recently wrote a book, entitled Bridge Across Broken Time, in which she links her own memories as the child of Jewish Holocaust survivors with those of Chinese victims of the Nanking Massacre and the violent crackdown in 1989 on Tiananmen Square. With images of 1989 fresh in her mind, Schwarcz visits Yad Vashem, the Holocaust memorial outside Jerusalem. There she realizes

the immensity both of the suffering that could not be commemorated in China after 1989 and of the Nanking Massacre of 1937 with its countless dead that had yet to become imprinted upon communal memory in Japan and the United States. I also sensed the magnitude of my own loss that could not be assuaged by the light of a candle, even if it was reflected one million times.[7]

Now, I don’t doubt the nobility of Professor Schwarcz’s sentiments, but I do wonder whether this sort of thing—even Maya Angelou’s poetry makes a cameo appearance in her book—is enlightening in any historical sense. In fact it is ahistorical, because the actual experiences of historical victims get blended in a kind of soup of pain. Although it is undoubtedly true that Chinese, Jews, gays, and others have suffered, it is not so that they all suffered in the same way. The distinctions tend to get lost. It is all too typical of our neo-Romantic age that a well-known Dutch ballet dancer and novelist named Rudi van Dantzig should announce in a pamphlet issued by the Resistance Museum in Amsterdam that homosexuals and other minorities in the Netherlands should take anti-Nazi resisters as models for their struggle against social discrimination.

But enlightenment is probably not the issue here. Instead there is authenticity. When all truth is subjective, only feelings are authentic, and only the subject can know whether his or her feelings are true or false. One of the most remarkable statements along these lines was written by the novelist Edmund White. In an article about AIDS literature, he argues that literary expressions of the disease cannot be judged by critical standards. As he puts it, a trifle histrionically: “I can scarcely defend my feelings beyond saying that it strikes me as indecent to hand out grades to men and women on the edge of the grave." He then stretches AIDS literature to encompass multiculturalism in general, and states not only that multiculturalism is incompatible with a literary canon, but “I’d go even further and say multiculturalism is incompatible with the whole business of handing out critical high and low marks." In other words, our critical faculties cannot be applied to novels, poems, essays, or plays expressing the pain of Others. As White says about the AIDS genre, “We will not permit our readers to evaluate us; we want them to toss and turn with us, drenched in our night sweats."[8]

What makes us authentic, then, as Jews, homosexuals, Hindus, or Chinese, is our sense of trauma, and thus our status as victims, which cannot be questioned. The vulgar Freudianism of this view is remarkable in an age of debunking Freud. In fact, Freud’s endeavors were themselves a brilliant product of late-nineteenth-century identity politics. To secular, bourgeois, assimilated German and Austrian Jews, psychoanalysis was a logical route to self-discovery. What Freud did for his Viennese patients is in a way what Edmund White and other identity politicians are now doing for their various “communities," and real politicians are borrowing their language.

Apart from the sentimentality that this injects into public life, the new religions of kitsch and death are disturbing for other reasons. Vera Schwarcz’s talk of building bridges between mourning communities notwithstanding, I think the tendency to identify authenticity in communal suffering actually impedes understanding among people. For feelings can only be expressed, not discussed or argued about. This cannot result in mutual understanding, but only in mute acceptance of whatever people wish to say about themselves, or in violent confrontation. The same is true of political discourse. Ideology has caused a great deal of suffering, to be sure, particularly in political systems where ideologies were imposed by force. But without any ideology political debate becomes incoherent, and politicians appeal to sentiments instead of ideas. And this can easily result in authoritarianism, for, again, you cannot argue with feelings. Those who try are not denounced for being wrong, but for being unfeeling, uncaring, and thus bad people who don’t deserve to be heard.

The answer to these problems is not to tell people to go back to their traditional places of worship, in an attempt to supplant pseudoreligions with established ones. I am not opposed to organized religion on principle, but as a secular person myself it is not my place to promote it. Nor am I against building memorials for victims of wars or persecution. The decision by the German government (subject to parliamentary approval) to build a Holocaust museum in Berlin is laudable, because it will also contain a library and document center. Without such a center it would just be a colossal monument. In the new plan memory will go together with education. Literature, of fact and fiction, about individual and communal suffering should have its place. History is important. Indeed there should be more of it. And it would be perverse to take issue with the aim of fostering tolerance and understanding of other cultures and communities. But the steady substitution of political argument in public life with the soothing rhetoric of healing is disturbing.[9]

So how do we deal with this? We can make a start toward resolving the problem by drawing distinctions where few are made now. Politics is not the same as religion, or psychiatry, even though it may be influenced by both. Memory is not the same as history, and memorializing is different from writing history. Sharing a cultural heritage is more than “negotiating an identity." It is perhaps time for those of us who have lost religious, linguistic, or cultural ties with our ancestors to admit to that and let go. Finally, and I think this goes to the heart of the matter, we should recognize that truth is not just a point of view. There are facts which are not made up but real. And to pretend there is no difference between fact and fiction, or that all writing is fiction, is to paralyze our capacity to distinguish truth from falsehood. And that is the worst betrayal of Primo Levi and all those who suffered in the past. For Levi’s fear was not that future generations would fail to share his pain, but that they would fail to recognize the truth.
Notes

[1] Tom Segev, The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust (Hill and Wang, 1993), p. 495.

[2] The Rape of Nanking (Basic Books, 1997).

[3] The Washington Post, October 15, 1998.

[4] “The Multicultural Misunderstanding," The New York Review, October 9, 1997.

[5] Segev, The Seventh Million, p. 516.

[6] See my article “India: The Perils of Democracy," The New York Review, December 4, 1997.

[7] Vera Schwarcz, Bridge Across Broken Time: Chinese and Jewish Cultural Memory (Yale University Press, 1998), p. 35.

[8] The Nation, May 12, 1997.

[9] But it is hard to see which ideologies will bring some clarity back to politics. The prevailing ideology in the US is market liberalism. Free trade in an unstable global market is breeding discontents. But its opponents, on the right and the left, have yet to come up with a coherent alternative.

It’s the time…

經過兩次含糊不清的記者會後,亞跆盟終於正式官方定調,他們認為問題是發生在比賽開始後工程人員發現腳跟有兩片貼片造成計分感應異常。

就是在等這一刻。No more hind and seek. Let’s lay things on the table. 如果從影像觀察以及楊淑君的說法無誤(電子襪後跟的貼片在開賽前已經先行卸下,而在終賽前的暫停期間由洪性天從台下把貼片再次拎出來),那麼就該讓亞跆盟遮掩裁判主觀誤判的污衊定調露出原形。
⋯⋯
既然亞跆盟公開指責中華台北代表隊欺騙,台灣政府就應以官方的立場透過管道提出嚴正抗議。尋求正式的國際仲裁管道固然必要,但時效不及、成效不明。台灣官方與民間媒體應該展開媒體宣傳戰,將世跆盟、亞跆盟從含糊到定調的說詞與實際檢查流程、現場錄影做對照,甚至回溯跆拳道在重要的世界賽事曾出現的爭議,製作成短片發送世界各大媒體,向世人、國際奧會發聲,形成國際輿論壓力,讓亞跆盟、世跆盟明白:既然要讓跆拳道走向國際,跆拳道就不再只是韓國人的。無論電子護具如何客觀,都不能成為韓國人長期把持國際跆拳組織與失格裁判的「公正糖衣」。若能讓運動真正歸運動、國際歸國際,楊淑君的犧牲比獲取金牌更具有意義

亞跆盟:中華隊有欺騙行為

* 2010-11-18
* 中國時報
* 【中央社】

 亞洲跆拳道聯盟今天在官網發佈新聞稿,以「中華台北的欺騙行為令人震驚」為題,描述廣州亞運中華隊選手楊淑君遭取消資格事件,並強調已對楊淑君及兩名教練處以禁賽處分。

 新聞稿指出,第16屆廣州亞運跆拳道項目首日就發生風暴,但幸好在跆拳道官員及時且謹慎的介入之後,安然度過。

 新聞稿表示,49公斤級賽事由楊淑君迎戰越南武氏厚,比賽開始時,前45秒都如常,直到1名電子護具得分系統的工程師發現楊淑君的得分方式與襪子看起來並不尋常。在工程師要求下,主審停止比賽,並檢查楊淑君的襪子,發現她的電子襪腳跟處非法多了兩片感應片。

 新聞稿並說,在聆聽中華台北代表團官員的說法並考量中華隊其他運動員權利之後,決定僅對楊淑君及兩名教練禁賽,而非中華隊全部隊員。

 此外,新聞稿也指出,楊淑君與教練遭禁賽的處分,會一直到世界跆拳道聯盟倫理委員會召開公聽會;而中華台北跆拳道協會相關人員,也必須接受世跆盟的調查,並依照競賽規則,給予適當的處分。991118

如果吳介民的〈富士康事件與中國模式〉談的是代工廠之勞動在地脈絡的處境,那麼楊偉中〈富士康:中國模式還是台灣模式〉一文則著重在跨區域的代工移轉。熟悉全球化理論的人應該對"Glocal" (glocalization)不陌生,這個詞正是要捕捉全球化或地方化兩者各自的不足與相互拉扯。OEM(original equipment manufacture)這個術語指的是全球化的統一製造模式,也就是代工廠房與人力管理的世界性移轉,但是人心畢竟無法OEM,在地的政府、制度、人力特質、文化因素等等都不盡相同,而代工廠卻只能用統一的管理、考量少許的差異性來獲得最有效率的產品生產與人力控管,就像鴻海所自豪的1%以下的不良率,而複雜的人心也是化約為「人力」來理解的,無論這其中包含的是多少的福利或報酬。

中國模式或台灣模式的論述,或許多少隱含著台灣某種習慣性的「中國 -台灣」政治框架,但姑且暫擱這個偏狹的政治框架不論。我可以理解昱某些對岸的友人對吳介民文章感到的某種不舒服,我剛讀的時候也覺得有些地方不足,因為他側重的是檢討在地脈絡,而沒把跨區域的代工歷史(即台商)納進來考慮。看到富士康在中國引爆的問題,身為台灣人的我也會感到某種同理與羞愧。楊偉中的文章多少說明了我的感受。不過,從吳文到楊文,也只談到問題的三分二而已。另外三分之一呢?從代工的跨國競爭與移轉的歷史來看,美國到日本到韓國到新加坡、台灣、東南亞、中國,這背後跟戰後第三世界(尤其是走向資本市場的民主化國家)的歷史足跡有關,換言之,不只有中國模式、台灣模式,還有日本、南韓、新加坡、泰國、越南…等或先或後的模式。弔詭且複雜的是,當我們站在看似傳統左派,也就是工人的立場來分析與批判剝削或壓榨的情況時,我們已經都是在資本開放的市場裡議論的。況且,當富士康提高工資,可能帶動其他代工廠的罷工潮,進而造成代工廠的移轉甚至出走。,這不也是台灣經歷過的代工產業出走的歷史嗎?所謂台灣模式,不只是所謂辛勤走過勞力壓榨的年代,還同時意味著台灣的經濟發展都透過工廠來造就就業機會與經濟產值,無論這經濟發展是總體的還是個體的層次。對薄利的代工廠而言,當中國的代工條件不再優渥,下一個模式會是哪兒呢。假使,當鴻海擴大無人工廠的生產模式時,或許到時候可能只有「鴻海模式」,而勞工將會面臨更嚴酷的失業問題。

我想到另一個層面的問題。台灣的代工歷史除了一些文章所說提到的,有家庭的支持之外,在那個年代有某種社會與文化特性是跟現代很不同的。譬如流行歌曲,現在的流行歌曲更多強調個人的感受力與主體性,無論是夢想、煩惱、情緒…,而以前的歌曲表現不是個體化的,而是帶有某種連帶或關係的牽扯在裡頭。這當然還不是很準確的思路,只是想試著從「世代」這個角度來看社會文化狀態的影響。中國大陸崛起的情況是很微妙的,雖然很像台灣經濟起飛的年代,但她的開放歷程所處的時代特性與台灣是相當不同的。想想:一個沒有手機、電腦、網路、有線電視頻道的年代,跟現在是多麼的不同啊。在這樣的時代差異裡,勞動者的心理與人格特質,是否也有所差異?台灣在80年代初有羅大佑的〈鹿港小鎮〉、90年代有林強的〈向前行〉,不知道千禧年後中國大陸的流行文化是如何回應這個社會?

(應上海大學朋友之邀,寫了篇文章評論在大陸火紅的電視劇《蝸居》。電視劇由小說改編,它所講述的上海炒樓故事,類似於台灣的無殼蝸牛面臨的情況,小說與電視劇所呈現的要來得深刻與世故許多。演員與劇本都很棒,可惜沒能在台灣播出)

I. 蕩在都市空間裡的慾望

《蝸居》的作者六六說,她想寫的是買房子的故事。只不過這故事說得情節曲折、話語直白,不僅挑逗讀者的交感神經,也擾動大眾的潛意識。「攢錢的速度永遠趕不上漲價的速度」是貫穿上層結構與下層結構的傳動主軸——無論這結構指涉的是文本架構、社會組構或是馬克思的政治經濟結構,牽動並扭曲了官商、男女之間的倫理關係。此「阿奇裡斯與烏龜追逐」式的主軸存在一個殘酷的現實:在資本化市場裡,住宅是人人企盼卻難以企及的商品。換言之,空間是做為慾望主體的人們所欲求的對象。然而,這樣的主軸與命題所點出的僅只是表象,彷彿空間是有別於人的外物,只是慾望的單向佔有,而我們對「什麼是慾望」的根本問題卻仍一無所悉。我的看法正好相反:空間要成為慾望的對象,慾望得先空間化。慾望本身是曖昧不明、游移不居、難以再現的,唯有把慾望空間化,才能將慾望給表徵出來並對之展開動員與部署。無論是晉階陞官的權力慾、發財致富的金錢慾、置車炒樓的購買慾、乃至於男女關係的情慾,諸種欲求都是慾望空間化所表徵的一股股能量,驅動著人們去佔據與領有空間,進而在空間中體驗(或想像)夢想的實現。在資本化的自由市場[1]裡,「夢想成真」的幸福感與其說是來自慾望的充分滿足,毋寧說這種幸福感早已在慾望的空間化部署過程預擬和排演,就好比酒家歡場安排的狂歡、迪士尼樂園規劃的驚喜,只等著人們帶著諸種欲求花錢買票入場,「重新」佔有空間並享受滿足慾望的快感。 (繼續閱讀…)

【由李宗盛、羅大佑等人組成的團體「縱貫線」於09年末到廣東開唱,在大陸似乎掀起不小的熱潮。在此之前,廣東的《佛山日報》徵稿件編了份特輯,我於是寫了篇短文過去,編輯對標題與內容做些調整,刊載出來(http://blog.citygf.com/yeah/Article/633977053649158921.aspx) 。除了標題之外,變動並不大,不過,我還是比較喜歡我原稿安排。】 (繼續閱讀…)

1.古典音樂是在真實中創造魔幻,現代音樂則是在純粹中創造 “真實"。但這個"真實"只是一種simulacra。Chomsky的變衍語法是一個個帶有意義的字詞組成不同、新意義的句法;現代音樂則是讓每個音回到音本身,抗拒任何意義,宛如喪失能指的純粹符號。純粹符號組成的句法是什麼意義呢?是魔咒,密碼,也是中滿想像力的空集合。

2.音樂的魂祟。純粹符號組成的空集合,在「東方」器樂與編曲中如何「東方」?它不是抗拒意義嗎?空集合,同時也接受任何意義的貫穿,但意義無法長久駐留。這是魂魅。東方的魂魅。

會議當天幾位發表的老師都提出精彩的見解,不過討論似乎可以更加精彩。鄭老師從Magritte寫給Foucault的信件來指出Foucault對This is not a pipe的誤解(這個部分很有意思);有點可惜,後來把結論導向對藝術家「原意」的維護與同情。現場一位藝術家對鄭老師的支持(其實我不太清楚這樣的表態"支持"了什麼),讓鄭老師獲得藝術界的溫暖,並半開玩笑地說他比較傾向支持藝術家、受不了社會學者…。這一來一往的簡短過程,彷彿讓藝評(包括各學門領域的美學批判)與藝文界之間劃出一道曖昧的溝,令我想到德希達在 ‘Sokal and Bricmont are not serious’ 提到:進行一次嚴肅反思的機會看來被浪費了。我的聯想或許不盡妥貼,畢竟昨日與會者們的發言與提問都是嚴肅的。不過,「溫馨接送」的玩笑情節似乎遮蔽昨天引起的一個更嚴肅的狀況:原來,在藝術與藝評,或廣義地說,人文與社會領域,這「一種文化」裡還可微分成「兩種文化」。

藝術創作者對作品相關的評論或論述進行回應不常見,尤其,Magritte還讀了《詞與物》才提筆寫信給Foucault。雙方都是嚴肅的。這事情本身就饒負意味了。現代藝術的作品(work)與藝術創作/工作者的勞動(labor)之間,還保有多少忠誠度?藝術家的創作與工作,是否也可能造出反叛自己的作品(或者這是藝術家的意圖或藝術的本質)?忠誠與背叛,不是在馬克思主義下勞動與成品之間「異化」的那種意識型態批判層面來談的,而是,當現代藝術越來越抽象化、造型化、觀念化,藝術創作/工作者其實也把作品投入了一個越來越不為他/她所掌控的場域(或市場)裡,即使作品上還刻著作家的簽名。

我也不是要宣告作者已死,取消藝術家在作品完成之後的發言。藝術家與作品之間好像透過隱而不顯的釣線拉著一紙在風中遊蕩的風箏。「大眾」(暫且假定一群人)往往需要沿著那透明般的線索,試圖找尋作者的意圖,彷彿才能成就觀看藝術作品的想像。究竟是「大眾」或具有知識能耐的藝評者更容易「否定」了藝術作品的原意?如果有人對「這不是一紙煙斗」的回答是:「胡扯」;「不然呢?」;「這仍是一紙煙斗」;或德希達的玩笑:「這是閹割的圖畫」呢?我要談論的並非原創者-作品-閱聽人之間的獨斷或民主(或民粹)的議題,而是想像力與判斷力的可能性。在什麼情況下,作品變成一個有待破解的謎(an encrypted work which needs labor of decryption),而謎腳究竟在
哪裡?假使藝術家的「澄清」是作品意涵的最後依準,判斷力批判是否需要接受另一層次的批判?

藝術家在作品完成後的發言是耐人思索的。如果這不會只被當成一種領域的宣告,那麼,這表示透過藝術作品或存在於藝術作品之外的一種溝通;藝術作品本身也可能因而成為無法溝通的斷裂。再者,藝術家對作品的文字說明,究竟是一種權威的宣稱,是一種補遺,還是對作品的二維創作?或者,藝術家也變成了作品的藝評家?藝術家總會死,與作品的關係就像斷線的風箏。藝術家死前的回應與死後的無法回應,是遺憾還是更為絕對的壟斷?這個問題也同樣適用於藝評者、藝術理論或論述者的身上。

會議中的討論,似乎把這些問題都簡化為藝術家保有本意的純粹性,而藝評者總易犯過度詮釋、誤解或扭曲。科學論戰中科學界對文化研究的「胡說」提出指責;讓我訝異的是,藝術家在這裡似乎不自覺地扮演這樣的角色。藝術與論述比起科學與人文社會,更「共謀」得多。只要看看在建築、設計、戲劇、美術、文學等教育過程中,教授如何審視學生作品背後的觀念,便可以知道藝術創作之前也可能偷渡了論述的語彙,轉化為非文字、非論述的表達形式。

原來魂牽夢縈根本不是時時刻刻
喪失自我的那種執迷
而是不知如何面對遺物
在心底反照出的一堵空缺

她們來自第三世界,流向第三世界
她們離開骨親家庭,照顧陌生家庭
她們在工廠聚集,在醫院看守
在冰冷線上打拼生產,在灰白病房見證死亡
她們的生命有我們不熟悉的世界
她們的世界有我們不可測的天地

p1150157-4 (繼續閱讀…)

在等
也沒等
沒等,只因品嚐深夜奇文紅葡酒
等候,只為期待早晨土司火腿蛋

在等
也沒等
沒等,只因貓兒好奇腳步緩
等候,只為和你輕輕道晚安

品味衣角的菌
聽聆字與字的間隙
嗅聞堆在皺折裡的秘密

佇立在巴別塔的窗口
尼采說:人性,太人性了
浸淫於此感官的旋廊
我說:視覺,太視覺了

這兒不缺眼睛,不乏凝視
但夜裡滿溢的:
咒般的符碼、思緒的溫度、色彩的紋理、話語的難以名狀
渴望聽聆,而非觀看
然而
以視線打造的閣樓
何處擺放耳朵的座席

啊,耳朵
令人陶醉的廢墟